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The US Navy continues to provide a forward presence, 
conduct freedom of navigation operations and deploy 
throughout the world. There exists a very real threat to 
the vessels and crew of the US Navy; terrorists have proven 
they are willing and able to use low-cost, high-impact 
weapons. The Navy needs weapons that are mobile, cost-
efficient, easily integrated into the fleet and, most 
importantly, these weapons are needed immediately.  This 
need, combined with current budgetary considerations, 
compels us to seek weapons that are ready to be employed 
into the fleet today.  The traditional evolutionary process 
will not provide a capable weapon in a timely or cost-
effective manner.  The need and the weapon exist today.  
That weapon is the Army M98A1 Javelin Anti-Armor Missile.   
    The goals of this thesis are to: 
 
(1) Examine the need for a stand-alone, point-defense  
    weapon to effectively combat the small boat threat  
   while underway in restricted waters as well as in 
  port. 
 
   (2) Discuss shortfalls of current weapons systems 
       used in the fleet to combat this threat. 
 
   (3) Identify the suitability of the Javelin to meet that 
       threat. 
 
(4) Discuss the potential cost avoidance available to  
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   The purpose of this paper will be to examine the need 
for a stand-alone, point-defense weapon for use on surface 
vessels to effectively combat the small boat threat while 
both underway in restricted waters where traditional 
organic weapons would prove ineffective or difficult to 
utilize as well as while in port where organic weapons 
systems are traditionally powered down or in an otherwise 
unusable state.  This paper will provide a realistic 
analysis of the current self-defense capabilities of US 
Navy ships against this type of threat.  It will provide a 
viable argument that there is in fact a need for a short- 
range weapon system capable of being employed while in port 
or when transiting through restricted waters. This paper 
will analyze and evaluate the constraints placed on the use 
of radar systems and their related weapons while in port or 
within a specified number of miles from land. This paper 
will address the current threat to surface ships vis-à-vis 
the October 12, 2000 terrorist attack upon the USS Cole in 
Yemen and a recent analysis by the UK Royal Navy (RN). 
   Furthermore, this paper will analyze the potential 
suitability and effectiveness of the US Army Javelin 
missile to meet this asymmetric threat.  This paper will 
attempt to address the lack of suitability of current 
weapon systems to combat this threat in terms of accuracy, 
effectiveness (lethality) and relative cost-per-kill.   
   Finally, this paper will analyze the cost that the US 
Army has invested in its acquisition of the Javelin 
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missile.  The goal will be to illustrate how both the US 
Navy and Army could benefit from a strategic financial 
partnership with respect to the continued funding and 
fielding of the Javelin missile.  In short, the intent of 
this thesis is to identify areas where US DoD can realize a 
tremendous cost savings while attaining a substantially 
improved self-defense capability against this asymmetric 
threat with minimal financial impact. 
  
B. BACKGROUND 
   The Royal Navy is currently undertaking plans to improve 
its anti-surface warfare (AsuW) capabilities.  The focus of 
these plans will be protection against “asymmetric” surface 
threats operating in the littoral regions.  The UK Ministry 
of Defence’s Directorate Equipment Capability (Above Water 
Battlespace)- DEC (AWB) have determined that there is a 
potentially dangerous gap in the ability of its ships to 
defend themselves against fast attack craft (FAC) and fast 
inshore attack craft (FIAC’s). They have decided to make 
this a priority in their force upgrades plan.   
   FAC’s are small combatants that are equipped with 
surface-to-surface guided weapons and FIAC’s are classified 
as small fast craft such as powerboats, interceptors, rigid 
inflatables and even jet skis.  These FIAC’s can be 
equipped with a range of short range weapons that include 
short range missiles, rockets, rocket-propelled grenades 
(RPG’s), heavy machine guns or as suicide vessels laden 
with high explosives.  
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   Attacking in “swarms”, these vessels generally lack the 
ability to sink a ship but the attacks would at least 
interfere with the ship completing its primary mission. 
However, it would not be impossible for one of these 
attacks to result in significant damage to a ship’s systems 
and sensors and effectively disabling a warship. [Ref.1] 
The US Navy, as it operates in almost all areas of the 
world is susceptible to the very same threats identified by 
the Royal Navy.  
   In addition to the direct and coordinated “swarm” 
attacks from organized enemies there exists an even more 
asymmetric threat, the terrorist suicide bomber.  The 
effectiveness of this method was evidenced on October 12, 
2000 in Yemen.  The Arleigh Burke destroyer, USS Cole 
despite being equipped with the sophisticated Aegis radar 
systems and being one of the most capable warships in the 
world, was quite literally crippled and 17 of her crew were 
killed by two men and a bomb in a small boat.  A vessel 
like the Cole was designed to protect a carrier battle 
group and engage in major air, sea and submerged threats in 
a large-scale sea battle.   
   This one billion dollar warship was equipped with 
missiles, guns, radars, countermeasure devices, “Phalanx 
Gatling guns”, helicopters and even torpedoes.  Despite all 
the armament and technology, protection against terrorist 
attacks is limited to the on-board security personnel armed 
with only small arms and fire hoses. [Ref. 2] Some may 
argue that the attack on the Cole was only successful due 
to the lack of response by the Captain and crew of the 
Cole.  This is not the crux of the issue, but it is used 
simply to illustrate the following two points. Firstly, a 
small suicide boat threat does in fact exist.  The second 
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point at issue is the fact that the principle means of 
defense against a threat of this type, in a situation such 
as this, is the arsenal of small arms on board the ships.  
  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
   This thesis will determine whether the small boat threat 
is a real one.  This thesis will, to a lesser degree, show 
that the threat which the organic weapon systems on the 
ships were designed counter are unlikely to be used by our 
present-day adversaries. Beyond the design limitations of 
these weapons, due to their minimum range and automaticity; 
there is a significant danger of fratricide due to their 
maximum ranges.  This thesis will show that the small arms 
presently used for ship’s self-defense are inadequate in 
both their accuracy and lethality.         
   It will also argue the fact that there is a need for a 
cost efficient, accurate point-defense weapon that can be 
easily integrated into the fleet in a cost-effective manner     
This thesis will also show that the US Army Javelin is a 
perfectly suited weapon to meet that need in all respects. 
   Finally, this thesis will attempt to quantify the 
potential cost savings that could be realized through the 
use of an already proven and existing weapons system.  “The 
acquisition of new weapon systems is a long and expensive 
process.  Research, Test, Development and Evaluation 
(RDT&E) is a critical, timely and costly step in that 
process.” [Ref. 1]   As the US Navy continues to fill its 
role in the pursuit of world peace through power projection 
and forward presence, our ships must be given the tools 
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with which to defend themselves. These tools must be 
capable, cost-effective and most importantly; they must be 
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II. CURRENT THREATS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
   The current threats, when combined with the necessarily 
restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) result in very short 
reaction times for self-protection.  This is the case for 
both the FIAC and the suicide boat attack scenarios.  This 
chapter will address both scenarios and the need for a 
significant added layer of defense.  In the case of the 
FIAC’s there are several factors that make it a difficult 
tactic for ships to defend themselves against.   
   It may be argued that there is little or no defense 
against an attacker who is willing to sacrifice his or her 
life for the lives of many victims; as was the case in the 
Cole attack.  While the argument may be taken to its 
logical conclusion, that in the future a small boat would 
not be allowed to approach as closely as the boat in Yemen.  
This only adds to the case for the need of a weapon that 
has the stopping power to quickly and efficiently destroy 
such an attacker once identified.   
   The following sections will address the current 
composition of ship’s self-defense weapons, the status of 
these weapons systems while transiting in and out of port 
as well as when they are along side the pier and their 
limitations against this type of attack while configured as 
such.  The author will also review the potential 
composition and tactics that attackers might use.  Finally, 
this section will give an economic evaluation of the threat 
and its appeal to terrorist and countries or organizations 
that do not maintain a “traditional” blue water navy.  
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B. CURRENT VULNERABILITIES/SHORTFALLS IN SELF-DEFENSE  
   In the previous section there were two situations 
referenced that placed US Naval ships in a less than 
optimal position for self-defense against the small boat 
threat. Both circumstances will be used to illustrate the 
shortfalls in the defensive postures of these vessels.  
While US Navy ships are entering or leaving a port and 
particularly when they are moored along side a pier, they 
are especially vulnerable to a suicide boat attack.  In the 
former they are severely limited in their ability to 
maneuver due to the usually narrow channels they must 
transit through and in the latter they are not maneuverable 
at all.   
   In addition to the vessel’s lack of maneuverability in 
both cases, there is the dilemma of how best to employ the 
limited number of ship’s force personnel while transiting a 
narrow channel.  All visual and radar navigation stations 
are manned.  All redundant ship steerage stations not 
normally manned are.  Additional lookouts are posted with 
communications to the bridge either directly or 
indirectly.  A high percentage of the crew is topside 
handling or preparing to handle lines. On the positive 
side, there is a heightened state of damage control 
preparedness due to the fact that all doors below main deck 
are made watertight and personnel are manning extra watch 
stations.  
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   In short, during what is called “restricted 
maneuvering”, a situation where almost all other concerns 
are secondary to the safe navigation of the ship, there is 
a shortage of personnel to protect the ship against a 
suicide boat attack.  “Today, when their enemy is unlikely 
to come at them with jets or submarines, when a fishing 
vessel could be a floating bomb, they (ship’s crew) must 
peer at every blip on their consoles.” [Ref. 4]  When ships 
are transiting through narrow channels there are sometimes 
literally hundreds of small contacts, each of which has the 
potential to be an attacker.   
   While along a pier, ships are even in less of a position 
to protect themselves effectively.  With sometimes as 
little as one-tenth of the crew on board, there is a 
shortage of personnel to provide an adequate topside 
presence.  As ships struggle to balance quality of life for 
its crew when in port against safety of the ship, the 
latter usually suffers.  Even when in a heightened state of 
readiness the ship’s force is limited in its arsenal of 
weapons available to defend against an attack.  Organic 
weapons systems are powered down for maintenance or safety. 
Even if these systems were powered up they would be 
ineffective due to their minimum ranges and the fact that 
the use of radars (which is used for targeting) is 
prohibited while in port.  Ship’s self-defense forces are 
limited to the use of 9 MM and 45 caliber handguns, M-14 or 
M-16 rifles and in extreme cases, 50 caliber M-60 machine 
guns. 
   There has been an increasing number of littoral 
campaigns in the recent years, operations in these confined 
coastal areas has changed both the significance as well as 
the nature of naval threats.  In these cases small fast 
craft, patrol boats and “rigid raiders” have the capability 
to sneak by radar coverage and come within close range (5 
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km) before they can be detected. [Ref. 5]  The “small boat” 
scenario is a very real one, simply because, you can hide 
small boats.    
   The bottom line is that the US Navy needs to prepare 
itself for the changing face of naval warfare; it needs to 
prepare to do battle in what is now known as “brown water”.  
These brown water engagements are those that take place in 
the enclosed waters near hostile shores.  A perfect example 
of this is the Persian Gulf region; there are numerous land 
bases from which small attack boats may come.  The threat 
will not come in the form of large and coordinated attacks 
but rather, they have the potential to come in the form of 
a surprise or even a disguised attack.  
   How effective would the weapons of a naval vessel that 
were originally designed to combat a large full-scale naval 
or air battle against other surface combatants be?  These 
vessels have numerous defenses against the large mass air 
raids from enemies such as the former Soviet Union and even 
the Anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM’s) from small and fast 
missile boats that are commonly found in almost all the 
navies of the world.  As effective as these weapons may be 
against the threats and tactics described above, they are 
limited in their usefulness against a dozen small, fast and 
maneuverable explosive-laden suicide boats.   
   In the best-case scenarios heavily armed combatant 
warships would, at the very least, suffer some level of 
degradation in their primary mission areas.  In the worst-
case scenarios non-combatant warships such as oilers and 
re-supply ships, mine counter-measure ships, command and 
control ships and even hospital ships would suffer much 
  10
worse from these attacks.  There is another class of ships, 
the amphibious assault ships, which fall into a category 
somewhere between these in both armament and vulnerability. 
The most vulnerable craft are surfaced submarines; these 
vessels have only small arms to defend themselves in these 
situations.  
 
C. ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF THREAT 
   “The United States is an unrivaled military superpower, 
with its precision guided weapons, well-trained troops and 
global reach.  So instead of fighting the Pentagon on its 
own terms, the nation’s (US’s) enemies have been looking 
for its Achille’s heal.” [Ref. 6]  This “Achille’s heel” is 
apparently taken advantage of in the form of “asymmetric 
warfare.”  This has been described by military theorists as 
“the use of unconventional tactics to counter the 
overwhelming conventional military superiority of an 
adversary.”  The author goes on to say that: “The US has an 
overwhelming technological superiority over the 
conventional military forces of virtually any conceivable 
adversary, but remains vulnerable to certain types of 
unconventional response: terrorist attacks, weapons of mass 
destruction, or unpredictable actions in unpredictable 
places, like the attack on the Cole in Aden.” [Ref. 7]  
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   In the end, asymmetric warfare means that someone isn’t 
playing fairly.  They are using tactics that haven’t been 
“agreed to.”  As we look at the significant economic and 
military advantage the United States has when compared to 
the resources of its adversaries, it is understandable why 
this path has been chosen.  What our enemies are looking 
for is two-fold.  They are looking to take advantage of our 
weaknesses and they want to do it cost-effectively.  The 
former has been illustrated above, and the latter will be 
illustrated in the following paragraphs.  With respect to 
their cost-effectiveness or, “bang for the buck”, the 
suicide boat more than pays for itself in results.  “The 
suicide boat attack is a poor man’s guided weapon. Clearly 
it is tremendously effective.  The attack killed five 
(later determined to be seventeen) Americans and disabled a 
billion-dollar US warship.” [Ref. 2]    
   In the case of the attack on the Cole, the exchange was 
very favorable on the side of the terrorists.  The cost of 
repairs for the Cole totaled $240 million. [Ref. 8] The 
costs were not just monetary; 17 crewmembers were killed 
and 37 were injured in the blast, which tore a hole in the 
ship's side. In addition to the cost in terms of lives and 
money, a new warship was taken out of operation for 18 
months.  The cost to the terrorist was minimal in 
comparison, 400-700 pounds   of C-4 military style plastic 
explosives that may or may not have cost them anything 
[Ref. 9], the lives of two willing extremists, a small 
rubber boat and some time. 
   There is little doubt that the highly sophisticated and 
expensive warships of the US Navy present very attractive 
targets to terrorists.  The tactics used are low-cost and 
have a very high impact on our forward deployed forces. It 
is a matter of fact that similar attacks will be attempted 
against our forces here in the United States.  As ships 
transit in and out of harbors like Norfolk and San Diego 
(two largest naval bases) they would be extremely 
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vulnerable to an attack from a handful of suicide boats 
such as Boston Whalers or powered fishing boats.  This 
scenario, when applied to ships entering ports like Hong 
Kong or Singapore where the number of boats in the harbor 
increases exponentially, illustrates that there is indeed a 
significant threat. 
   Although there have been no attacks on US ships in those 
regions, there have been attacks that fit this profile.  In 
September of 2001 a group calling themselves the “Tamil Sea 
Tigers” attempted a suicide attack against a merchant ship 
transporting about 1,200 government soldiers to the Jaffna 
peninsula. In this attack approximately 20 explosive-laden 
boats with “suicide cadres” on board attacked the Pride of 
the South.  The soldiers on board fired on the boats and 
destroyed two of them; one of the Sri Lankan patrol craft 
was damaged by a suicide boat and was towed back to port. 
This attack was the second such attack in 24-hours by the 
rebel naval wing of the Tamil Tigers. Another attack 
damaged a military craft when a suicide boat exploded at 
the mouth of the eastern port of Trincomalee.   
   The tactic of using explosive-laden suicide boats to ram 
and sink military vessels is being used quite regularly in 
Sri Lanka’s northern and eastern regions.  The attacks were 
proven to be effective when on 24 July of the same year the 
“Tigers” devastated the country’s only international 
airport in a land-based version of these suicide attacks by 
destroying a dozen commercial and military aircraft. [Ref. 
10] 
   Other examples of the potential use of these tactics 
include the 23 October, 2002 attack on a Greek warship 
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operating near the entrance to the Persian Gulf.  A small, 
high-speed boat approached the Greek ship. The ship fired 
warning shots and the boat turned away. A nearby group of 
Japanese support ships was warned and placed on alert, 
fearing the incident indicated another al Qaeda attempt to 
attack ships from nations supporting the war on terror. 
Also, Yemen has admitted that the recent explosion and fire 
aboard a 300,000-ton French oil tanker Limburg was the 
result of a 6 October, 2002 terrorist attack. The tanker 
had slowed to pick up a pilot for entry to Yemen's oil 
loading facility. A small boat approached and there was an 
explosion when the boat appeared to hit the Limburg. 
   Again, the use of suicide boat attacks using 
conventional explosives is not a new tactic. In May of 
1964, the USNS Canard (World War II escort carrier) was 
sunk by VC terrorists as it sat dockside in Saigon Harbor. 
Military Sea Lift Command had used the Canard for troop and 
aircraft transport. [Ref 11] Conventional bombs have been 
the weapon of choice for terrorists throughout the years. 
Their repertoire includes shootings, bombings and 
assassinations.  Prior to the recent combined attack on the 
World Trade Centers and the Pentagon (which it could be 
argued also falls into the category of a suicide bombing), 
the majority of US personnel killed by terrorists have been 
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III. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT WEAPONS SYSTEMS ON US SHIPS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
US Navy ships use what is called a “layered defense” in 
the employment of their weapons for self-defense. This term 
is generally associated with air defense and usually 
includes the use of inorganic assets such as satellite 
imagery and carrier-based aircraft.  This terminology can 
logically be applied to the manner in which US Navy ships 
defend themselves against surface vessels.   
For the purpose of this thesis the author will assume 
that we are discussing only organic (shipboard) weapons 
systems.  This is not done as a matter of convenience; 
rather this is done as a matter of reality.  The situations 
when there are inorganic assets available for protection 
against surface vessels occur generally when ships are 
conducting open ocean operations far away enough away from 
land so that the type of threat we are discussing literally 
does not exist.   
The organic weapons that US Navy ships have at their 
disposal for use against a small surface vessel include the 
following:  
1) SH-60B Helicopter (Penguin Missiles) 
2) Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile (TASM)  
3) Harpoon Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) 
4) Standard Missile (SM-1 & 2) in “Surface 
Mode” 
5) Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) 
6) NATO Sea Sparrow Missile (NSSM) 
7) 5-inch Gun  
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8) 76 MM/ 3- inch Gun 
9) Close-In Weapons System-1B (CIWS-1B)  
10) 25 MM Bushmaster Chaingun 
11) M-60 Machine Gun/ .50 Cal  
12) Small arms (9 MM, Shotgun, 45 Cal, M-14, M-
16) 
 
   While the preceding list seems to provide a formidable 
arsenal for the ship to draw upon for self-defense, there 
are several reasons that there is still a need for a more 
effective weapon system.  All of these weapons are not 
available on all ships and most of these weapons are not 
suitable for the threat being discussed.  With respect to 
suitability, the following criteria have been established 
to define what that entails.  The weapon must be feasible 
to use, have a relatively low cost-per-kill and perhaps 
most importantly, it must be effective in combat. 
   “Feasibility of use” implies that it is a weapon that 
the Commanding Officer (CO) of a ship would be willing to 
or able to use if the situation warranted it.  For example, 
how willing would the CO of ship pulling into San Diego 
harbor be willing to have the CIWS mounts or the deck guns 
rotating and pointing at every small craft that was 
floating past them?  Would he or she be willing to 
authorize the release of a weapon that could easily travel 
beyond the horizon?  The second aspect of “feasibility” is 
whether or not they could be used at all.  If a ship were 
sitting next to a pier, given the current restrictions on 
transmitting radar while in port, both of the previously 
mentioned weapons would be incapable of being employed at 
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all. Or more than likely in the case of a missile, is the 
target inside our minimum engagement envelope? 
   “Relative cost-per-kill” refers to the cost per 
successful engagement (assuming that the target is 
destroyed or neutralized with the minimum designed salvo 
size). In the case of a missile engagement, the actual cost 
of the missile would be the cost-per-kill (assuming target 
destruction or neutralization with one missile).  While it 
could be argued that the dollar value would be 
insignificant if a potential attacker were killed, it still 
requires some consideration.  If for no other reason, one 
must take into consideration the fact that there will be 
both training and qualification expenses associated with 
each weapons system considered. 
   Finally, third in the list of criteria to be considered 
(and perhaps the first in importance) would have to be 
combat effectiveness or the likelihood of success in 
destroying an attacker. Just how effective is an eighteen 
or nineteen-year-old sailor shooting an M-14 or M-16 at a 
small moving target in the dark?  How effective is a 5-inch 
gun against a high speed, maneuvering target? 
 
B. MISSILES 
1. Penguin Missile 
   As we work our way from the outside of the engagement 
envelope to the inner portion we first look at the missile 
defense systems available for ship’s self-defense.  The 
first “layer” would be the SH-60B helicopter that is 
employed only on Cruisers, Spruance Destroyers, Flight IIA 
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Arleigh Burke Destroyers and Frigates. The primary mission 
of these helicopters is that of Anti-Submarine Warfare 
(ASW). Some of these helicopters are equipped to employ the 
Mk 2 Mod 7 “Penguin” missile. SH-60B’s equipped with the 
missile can be used in the additional role of Anti-surface 
warfare (ASUW) attack.   
 
Figure 2: AGM-119B Penguin Anti-Ship Missile [From Ref. 12] 
 
   Besides the fact that not all ships have this asset 
available, the shortcoming of this helicopter-launched 
missile in this warfare area is three-fold. First, in the 
coastal or littoral environment these helicopters can 
easily fall within the engagement envelopes of a variety of 
surface-to-air missiles from shore.  Secondly, to use a 
helicopter in an ASUW role such as this, there would have 
to be some type of warning that an attack was imminent or 
at least probable.  Finally, in the case of the narrow 
channel transit in and out of a busy port, it would be 
dangerous to attempt to employ a weapon such as the Penguin 
missile.  The missile has a 120 kg warhead and is designed 
to inflict serious damage to a medium-sized surface 
  20
combatant.  The size of the warhead, its 25 nautical mile 
range and the fact that the potential target would be in 
close proximity to the ship being defended would make it 
difficult if not impossible to employ the weapon with any 
confidence. [Ref. 12]  
 
   2. Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile 
   The next missile in the arsenal would be the Tomahawk 
Anti-Ship Missile or “TASM”. The US Navy originally 
developed the Tomahawk missile as the TLAM-N (Land Attack 
Missile-Nuclear strike variant) with TLAM conventional and 
TASM anti-ship variants following later.  The TASM has a 
very real problem at both the lower and extreme end of its 
range envelope.  The TASM has an operating range of 250 
nautical miles and a maximum range of 470 nautical miles. 
[Ref.13] In addition to this impressive maximum range the 
issue of TASM’s minimum range (classified) is such that it 
would make TASM virtually useless in an environment such as 










Figure 3: BGM-109 Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile [From Ref. 16] 
    Beyond the range limitations mentioned above, the firing 
weight of a Tomahawk missile is 2,650 pounds; add to that a 
550-pound booster and an average unit cost of $1,400,000 
and you have a very large and very expensive weapons 
system. [Ref. 14] These specifications force the TASM to 
fail in both the relative cost-per-kill and feasibility of 
use criteria. Even if this weapon was useful in terms of 
feasibility of use, there is yet another problem. As the 
targets that absolutely needed such a large warhead were 
pretty much gone, the TASM has been withdrawn from service.  
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the ships that the TASM 
was designed to kill, cruisers of 6,000 tons and up, pretty 
much disappeared.  Those TASM’s that are left in the 
inventory are being converted to Block III TLAM’s. [Ref. 
15]   
 
   3. HARPOON Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
   Next in our missile arsenal is the HARPOON Anti-Ship 
Cruise Missile (ASCM).  The HARPOON missile was designed to 
sink warships in an open-ocean environment. Other weapons 
(such as the Standard Missile and Tomahawk missiles) can be 
used against ships, but the HARPOON and the previously 
mentioned Penguin are the only missiles used by the United 
States military with anti-ship warfare (ASUW) as their 
primary mission area.  
   Despite a sophisticated guidance system, the HARPOON 
cannot pick a hostile contact from a group of contacts 
particularly if the contact is a small gunboat. [Ref. 17] 
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The design aspects and capabilities of the HARPOON missile 
are indeed impressive.  The factors that make this weapon 
system such an ideal and capable weapon for open-ocean 
warfare against moderate to large sized ships are exactly 
the ones that make the missile grossly inappropriate for 
close-in defense against a small surface target.  By 
definition, the AGM-84D HARPOON is an “all-weather, over-
the-horizon, anti-ship missile system” with a penetration 
488-pound high explosive warhead (total weight of 1,145 
pounds) and a unit cost of $720,000 [Ref. 18].  These high 
cost factors, combined with nearly the same low-end 
envelope limitations as the “TASM” and a similar high-end 
envelope issues, make the HARPOON missile fail the same 
criteria as the TASM and for the same reasons.      
 
Figure 4: AGM-84D HARPOON Anti-Ship Missile [From Ref. 19] 
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   4. Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) 
   The Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) is the primary weapon 
for self-defense on many non-Aegis US Navy ships.  As of 
March 2000, the RAM Block 1 system has been installed on 
two LSD class ships, pending installation on two more LSD 
41 class ships, LHD 7 and CVN 76.  Plans call for the 
installation or upgrade of the Block 1 systems on 8 LSD 
41/49 class ships, 3 DD 963, 12 XCV/CVN ships, 7 LHD and 
LPD 17 (new construction) ships between 2001 and 2006. 
[Ref. 20] In short, the US Navy has invested a significant 
amount of money to give ships the ability to protect 
themselves.        
   RAM was designed to be an effective, low cost, 
lightweight quick-reaction, self-defense system that 
increases the survivability of ships that were otherwise 
undefended. It is a 5-inch missile that utilizes SIDEWINDER 
missile technology for the warhead and rocket motor, and 
the STINGER missile’s infrared seeker. RAM Block 1 upgrade 
has a limited capability against helicopter, aircraft, and 
surface (HAS) targets. This HAS improvement (in the form of 
a software upgrade) is currently being developed and is 
expected to undergo operational testing in FY 03. 
Concurrent with this design effort, an 11-round launcher 
system is also being developed for smaller ships and other 
vessels that have weight constraints. [Ref. 20] 
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Figure 5: RIM-116A Rolling Airframe Missile [From Ref. 20] 
 
   The RAM has a unit cost of $444,000 (Block 1), and 
carries a 25-pound warhead; it has an IR and RF-seeking 
warhead, a launch weight of 162 pounds and a range of 
approximately 11 miles. The US Navy is considering 
installing the 11-round launcher on CG 52 through CG 73 
between 2004 and 2009 as well. All of this capability is 
contained in one of two launching vehicles (21-round or 11-
round launcher).  
   At first glance the weapon system seems to be both a 
very affordable and very effective weapon.  The system 
apparently meets two of the three criteria readily. It is 
in the feasibility of use that we find the weakness of the 
RAM in this threat area. To a lesser degree, there are also 
issues with its effectiveness.  
   Feasibility of use, assuming that a ship that has this 
weapon system (non-Aegis) is transiting into or out of a 
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busy and friendly harbor, how likely is the CO to have the 
system activated, with the launcher rotating and changing 
elevations as it targets any number of vessels?  Even if a 
CO had indications and or warnings that an attack was 
possible, there would come a point that the maximum 11-mile 
range would become a limiting factor.   
   Another issue is the fact that the weapon uses combined 
infrared and radio frequency energy for targeting.  A small 
boat attacking a ship with the intent being to ram it and 
detonate an explosive charge would not likely have any type 
of active transmitters onboard- this targeting method is a 
carryover from the weapon system’s purpose of anti-ship 
missile defense.  Secondly, there is still the lack of 360-
degree coverage for the ship in question. The most 
significant shortcoming is the fact that this weapon 
becomes useless once along side the pier. It is unlikely 
that a base commander or CO of a ship would encourage or 
allow a weapon system with an eleven mile range to be 
powered up and ready to go pier-side.   
   While this weapon does provide a much-needed point- 
defense against anti-ship cruise missiles it is not the 
best weapon to use against this type of threat.   
 
   5. NATO & Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile 
   The NATO Sea Sparrow Missile (NSSM) is also a primary 
self-defense weapon used on many US Navy ships.  The 
missile is classified as a radar-guided, air-to-air missile 
with a high explosive warhead. It has a cylindrical body 
with four wings at mid-body and four tail fins. The Navy 
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uses the missile primarily for surface-to-air anti-missile 
defense. The missile has a launch weight of 500 pounds and 
a maximum range of anywhere between 6 and 30 nautical miles 
(depending on which source is referenced) and a minimum 
range of approximately 1,600 yards. It has a 90-pound 
annular blast fragmentation warhead (35 pounds of which is 
explosive).  The missile can be ordered from off to standby 
in 180 seconds and be ready to launch 2.3 seconds later. 
Maximum missile altitude is 25,000 feet. The warhead is 
both proximity and contact fused. It produces a 
continuously expanding rod 27-foot kill radius.  The 
current unit cost for this missile is $165,400. [Ref. 21] 
 
Figure 6: RIM-7 Sea Sparrow Missile [From Ref. 21] 
 
   There is an enhanced or “evolved” version coming to the 
fleet this year known as the “Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile” 
or “ESSM”.  Again, this is still classified as a short-
range missile intended to provide self-protection for 
surface ships against anti-ship cruise missiles. It will be 
more capable against low observable highly maneuverable 
missiles, have longer range, and can make flight 
corrections via radar and midcourse uplinks.  
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   On Aegis ships, ESSM will be launched from the MK 41 
Vertical Launch System (quad-pack), requiring some 
modifications to the missiles themselves. On non-Aegis 
ships (aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, other 
surface combatants), it will be fired from a variety of 
launch systems. ESSM uses an 8 inch diameter body that 
includes an additional modified guidance section than the 
currently in-service RIM-7P Sea Sparrow. [Ref. 21] The 
final phase of the ESSM’s flight test program is scheduled 
for early spring 2003, when performance with the AEGIS Fire 
Control System of the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class 
guided missile destroyers will be verified. [Ref. 22]  
Again, the focus continues to be on Anti-ship Cruise 
Missile defense. 
   Both the NSSM and the ESSM are primarily designed as a 
point-defense to combat the air threat. The use of either 
weapon against a speedboat or suicide boat attack threat is 
limited at best.  NSSM, the current version, is currently 
the primary missile defense weapon on aircraft carriers, 
large deck amphibious assault ships, frigates and some 
other vessels.  The ESSM upgrade will allow the use of 
these missiles on VLS ships as well (CG’s and DDG’s).   
   Firstly, with respect to cost-per-kill of these weapons, 
they do seem to be a relatively inexpensive weapon to use 
($165,000 per round).  With respect to the weapon’s combat 
effectiveness; these weapons systems, as stated above, were 
originally designed to combat an air threat.  As a result 
of this, their use in an ASUW mode is somewhat limited.  
There have been tests and evaluations that showed limited 
success in this mission area.  Some of the limitations in 
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this area include the minimum range of 1,600 meters, 
launcher cutouts and their substantial maximum effective 
range.   
   With a minimum range of 1,600 meters, their use in 
combating an attack from a small boat threat is lacking.  
The decision to fire the missile against a potential 
attacker would have to be made once the target is no less 
than a mile away.  Given the current rules of engagement 
and the prerequisite for a positive visual identification 
of the target as a threat, this would be a serious 
performance detractor.   
   The cutouts of the NSSM launchers in use today would 
mean that there would definitely be approaches that a small 
boat could take that would make it impossible for the NSSM 
to engage.  The Vertical Launching Systems (VLS) that will 
launch the ESSM will necessarily increase the minimum 
range, as the missile will have to clear the launching 
vessel by some distance prior to beginning its “tip-over” 
towards the direction of the threat.                    
   Finally, in looking at the issue of feasibility of use- 
we first must look at maximum range considerations.  If we 
use the most common maximum effective range advertised (10 
nm) we see that the possibility exists for this weapon to 
miss its target and continue on and detonate its warhead 
where it might harm friendly or neutral traffic, especially 
in a crowded harbor environment.  
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   The next issue of feasibility of use takes into 
consideration the fact that you would be looking at a 
missile launcher training and elevating as a ship transits 
through narrow channels.  This is a situation that the CO 
of a ship would, at the very least, be uncomfortable with.  
Once the ship is tied up next to a pier this weapon system, 
as were the others discussed, is rendered totally useless. 
The requirements from ship’s power, targeting data from a 
radar system and extra manning requirements make the weapon 
truly not able to be used while in port.          
 
   6. SM-1 & 2 (Surface Mode) 
   The primary Anti-air defense weapon for the US Navy is 
the Standard Missile (SM).  There are several versions of 
this weapon both in use and currently in development.  The 
SM-1 is used on frigates and the SM-2 (several variants or 
blocks) fills the magazines of all destroyers and cruisers 
in the fleet.  The SM-2 is 15 to 26 feet in length, weighs 
1,100 to 3,000 pounds (dependent upon which block) and has 
a surface mode range limited to the radar horizon of the 
launch platform. The minimum launch range is classified, 
but since it has a booster section it uses during the 
initial flight phase, it is not short enough to allow for 
it to be used effectively as a defense against the threat 
we are discussing.  [Ref. 24]  




    Figure 7: RIM-67 Standard Missile [From Ref. 23] 
   Furthermore, with a unit cost of over $400,000 each, its 
cost-per-kill is relatively high.  This weapon, while 
extremely accurate against a large surface combatant within 
approximately ten nautical miles would be a poor choice 
against a target of this size.  
 
C. GUNS 
   1. 5-Inch Gun 
   Next in our shipboard arsenal is a category that falls 
somewhere between small arms and missiles, the guns.  The 
5"/54 MK 45 Light Weight Gun Mount (LWGM) is the Navy's 
primary anti-surface gun battery, and Naval Surface Fire 
Support (NSFS) weapon. When a target is within the 
engagement envelope, the 5" gun is significantly more 
economical than a guided weapon such as a missile. The gun 
is also used, to a limited extent, in an anti-air defense 
capacity. 
   The 54 caliber (MK 45) lightweight gun can supposedly 
provide surface combatants a defense against fast, highly 
maneuverable surface targets, air threats and shore targets 
during amphibious operations. The 5-inch gun is controlled 
by either the MK 86 Gun Fire Control System or MK 160 Gun 
Computing System. Range is more than 13 nautical miles and 
can fire 16-20 rounds per minute. Each magazine has a 
capacity of 475-500 rounds. [Ref. 24] This gun is installed 
on Spruance-class Destroyers as well as on guided missile 





Figure 8: MK 45 5-inch / 54-Caliber Gun [From Ref. 25] 
 
   There are those who argue that while missiles like NSSM, 
ESSM and RAM offer great lethality at longer ranges, a gun 
system coupled with both infrared and radar-based sensors 
is the most effective manner to combat the close-in threat 
posed by small boats and helicopters. [Ref. 26]  
   The shortcomings of this weapon against the small 
boat/suicide boat threat are not in the cost-per-kill 
category.  Where the weapon is found lacking is in the 
measurement of the other two criteria (effectiveness and 
feasibility of use).  When engaging a target such as a 
fast-moving speedboat, the gun is placed in a mode of fire 
called the “High-Speed Maneuvering Surface Target” or 
“HSMST” for short. When in this mode the system generates 
algorithms and uses other enhanced features in the fire 
control system to aid in the targeting of these fast-moving 
vessels.  Also, High Explosive, Controlled, Variable Time 
(HE-CVT) rounds are used, these rounds provide a 30-foot 
air burst over the water and detonate above the target. 
[Ref. 27] 
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   While in theory the system is designed to counter the 
small boat threat, there is evidence to the fact that the 
system lacks true lethality.  Tests conducted using the USS 
Donald Cook (DDG 75), were said to demonstrate “the 
capability to defeat a single high-speed, maneuvering 
surface target simulating the patrol boat threat…” 
according to the testers.  Further in the report there were 
several details that left many questions as to the accuracy 
or realism of the findings.   
   “Since the crew was fully alerted in this event, we are 
unable to assess whether comparable results could be 
achieved in a tactically realistic scenario.”  The report 
went on to say “15 percent of the rounds fired by the 
ship’s MK 45 gun hit the target during the test.  Another 
24 percent were near misses.”  The question follows, if the 
crew was alerted and told what to expect, from what 
direction and at exactly what time; and was only able to 
achieve 15 percent accuracy; how well would they do if they 
were truly surprised?  [Ref. 28]  All of these points lead 
to questionable effectiveness of the 5-inch gun. 
   As we look at the “feasibility of use” criteria, there 
are several issues that make this weapon an unlikely choice 
in the environment we are discussing.  When we take into 
consideration the fact that this gun requires the use of a 
radar for its targeting, requires ship’s power for its 
operation, is only on two ship classes in the fleet and has 
a range of more than thirteen nautical miles we find that 
it is unlikely to be used while transiting in and out of 
port or while pier-side.   
  33
   This is also a weapon that very visibly slews and 
elevates, this would be undesirable while either transiting 
through a harbor or while sitting next to a pier.  If, in 
an extreme case, a ship did decide to use the 5-inch gun as 
a defense against small boats, this mechanical training and 
elevating is very inflexible.  There are in fact many 
“cutouts” or areas that the gun is either limited or cannot 
engage at all. In the figure below the cutouts of an 
Arleigh Burke Destroyer with one 5-inch gun are shown.  It 
is evident that an approach from the front or rear would 
make the gun nearly useless and since a ship transiting 
through a channel or tied to a pier is at best limited in 
its maneuverability- this is a significant issue.  
 




   2. 76 MM (3-Inch) Gun 
   The MK 75 76mm gun is a lightweight, rapid-fire three-
inch gun mounted on Oliver Hazard Perry-class Frigates (one 
gun mount each).  The gun can fire up to 80 rounds per 
minute without reloading to a range of 10 nautical miles. 
This gun is remotely controlled and very accurate against 
small surface contacts.  Since the weapon system is only on 
a handful of ships (of the 51 ships built for the US Navy, 
33 are in active commissioned service and 10 are in the 
Naval Reserve Force).  The "short-hull" Perry-class 
frigates are being retired at an advanced rate, even though 
they have 20 years left on their lives. As of early 2002 
the Navy planned to decommission its five remaining "Flight 
I" (non-SH-60 capable) Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided-
missile frigates by FY 2004. [Ref. 30] In total these ships 
will equate to roughly only ten percent of the US Navy’s 
total surface ship force. 
 
 
Figure 10: MK 75 76mm Gun [From Ref. 31] 
 
   This weapon system, while effective in the littoral 
regions and against this type of threat is still lacking in 
its “feasibility of use criteria.” In addition to its very 
limited quantity, the weapon suffers from the same issue of 
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needing to use a radar system to generate a fire control 
solution for a perspective target. In the littoral 
environment this would not be an issue, but once the ship 
is next to a pier for any amount of time the radars are 
shut down.   
   The weapon system is a gun mount, and as such, it trains 
and elevates; this fact makes it again, an uncomfortable 
situation for other vessels in the vicinity.  Yet another 
issue with the training and elevating of the mount, its 
position (amidships) on the frigates makes them useless for 
defense against a head-on or aft-on attack. The positioning 
of the weapon means that the gun has significantly larger 
cutouts than the previously referenced 5-inch guns.  This 
lack of flexibility is significant. Similar to a number of 
the other weapon systems on US Navy ships, the extreme end 
of the engagement envelope (10nm) makes it dangerous to use 
while in a crowded channel or harbor.     
   The weapon is effective (in terms of lethality) and has 
a relatively low cost-per-kill, but its use is limited when 
in port.  Given the already limited amount of space on 
ships, it is unlikely that this weapon system could be 
installed on ships other than the frigates it was designed 
for.  The current trend seems to be that if there is any 
space available on a ship, a missile system will use it.         
 
   3. CIWS 1B           
   One of the most common weapons systems in use on surface 
combatants today is the Phalanx Close-In Weapons System or 
“CIWS” made by Raytheon.  There have been over 870 of these 
units produced for twenty-one nations.  The Phalanx employs 
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a Gatling gun consisting of a rotating cluster of six 
barrels.  The system fires a 20mm sub-caliber sabot 
projectile using a heavy-metal (either tungsten or depleted 
uranium) 15 MM penetrator surrounded by a plastic sabot and 
a lightweight metal pusher. The Gatling gun fires 20 MM 
ammunition at either 3,000 or 4,500 rounds-per-minute with a 
burst length of continuous, 60, or 100 rounds from a 989 or 
1,550-round magazine. [Ref. 32] The weapon is currently 
employed on virtually every ship in the US Navy. 
 
 
Figure 11: MK 15 Phalanx CIWS (1B) [From Ref. 33] 
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   The first version of this weapon (Block 0) was designed 
for defense against Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM’s) and 
later saw improvements with the Block 1A version against 
the same threat. The newest variant, the Block 1B Phalanx 
Surface Mode (PSuM) allows engagement of small, high-speed, 
maneuvering surface craft; and low, slow-moving aircraft, 
and hovering helicopters. This upgrade incorporates a 
thermal imager, an automatic acquisition video tracker, and 
a stabilization system for the imager, providing both day 
and night detection of threats. The thermal imager improves 
the system's ability to engage anti-ship cruise missiles by 
providing more accurate angle tracking information to the 
fire control computer. Additionally, the thermal imaging 
assists the radar in engaging some ASCM’s bringing a 
greater chance of ship survivability. The thermal imager 
Automatic Acquisition Video Tracker (AAVT) and 
stabilization system provide surface mode and electro-optic 
(EO) angle track.  
   Operational evaluation of Block 1B, conducted aboard USS 
Underwood (FFG-36) and the Self-defense Test Ship, was 
completed in August 1999. According to Phalanx Program 
Office plans, Block 1B will be installed in 11 other FFG-7 
ships between June 2000 and July 2002. [Ref. 34] 
   This new upgrade greatly increases the fire power 
available to surface ships in the fleet and perhaps most 
notably, CIWS-1B brings a day and night surface mode 
capability to this proven air defense weapon system, 
allowing highly responsive engagement of threats such as 
small boats, jet skis, and floating mines out to a range of 
4000 yards. 
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   As of November 2001 the unit cost for a CIWS 1B mount 
was between $6.5 and $10 million depending on the quantity 
and other factors.  Up until that same time period the 
government had under contract 28 CIWS mounts. In the FY02 
budget the US Navy included in excess of $40 million for 
additional “Block 1B kits” (upgrades to block 0 CIWS 
systems). [Ref. 26] In the FY 02 Budget and the FY03 Budget 
Submission, the US Navy has accelerated the upgrade of the 
CIWS system to the Block 1B variant.  The FY03 Budget 
submission initiates a CIWS Block 1B procurement and 
conversion program (1B kits) geared to expeditiously 
deliver significantly enhanced ship self-defense and anti-
terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) to amphibious ships, 
surface combatants and carrier force. The FY 02 and FY 03 
funding plan is postured to "jump start" conversion of CIWS 
gun mounts to Block 1B and the objective is to provide 
Block 1B capability across the surface force within the 
FYDP. [Ref. 35] 
   The only exception to the apparent proliferation of this 
weapon is the fact that, despite the effectiveness of this 
new and improved version, CIWS is being slowly replaced by 
the RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missiles discussed earlier. 
Nearly all new-construction ships will be commissioned with 
RAM instead of CIWS. The high cost of this weapon system 
could be justified by its “fit” to the threat and its 
effectiveness.  The only criteria that the CIWS 1B could be 
found lacking in, is in the area of “feasibility of use.”  
   Firstly, the fact that the weapon is being replaced by 
the RAM system means that it will not be on the newer ships 
coming to the fleet.  Next, the weapon discharges 4,500 
rounds per minute, while these lethal 20 mm rounds are not 
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sent down range indiscriminately, the possibility does 
exist that a handful of these rounds could make their way 
past the target and hit some unintended targets.  Next, the 
system is not “stand-alone,” it requires power input from 
the ship as well as a pneumatic support system (air) for 
its operation.  It must be manned remotely from either a 
local or remote control panel (LCP or RCP); this 
requirement would effectively negate the desired visual 
identification (VID) that would be required during an 
engagement such as this.  This feature, while not an issue 
in open-ocean combat, would greatly limit the systems 
usability in a crowded harbor environment.  
   Also, while this is much less of an impact than with 
some other weapons systems, current placement of the CIWS 
mounts do have cutouts that would limit their engagement 
envelopes.  These systems were initially placed on ships in 
positions that would facilitate engaging air threats. 
Finally, the system is quite lethal, and the lack of first 
person identification of the target prior to batteries 
release would make it difficult for the CO of a ship to 
comfortably leave the system loaded and in a “ready-to-go” 
condition in anything but an “attack imminent” situation. 
 
   4. 25 MM CHAINGUN 
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   The MK-38 25 MM “Chaingun,” also known as the 
"Bushmaster," is a navy version of the externally powered 
weapon developed for the US Army as the Mk-242. The Mk-38 
is a 25 MM automatic gun system that provides surface ships 
with defensive and offensive gunfire capability for the 
engagement of a variety of surface targets. It is designed 
to provide close range defense against patrol boats, 
swimmers, floating mines, and various targets ashore 
including enemy personnel, lightly armored vehicles and 
terrorist threats. Only one crewman is required for 
operation and the maximum range is 6,000 yards (maximum 
effective range is 2,700 yards).  The MK 38 has a maximum 
firing rate of 175 rounds per minute and it is loaded with 
a 170-round magazine.  
   This system consists of the M242 auto-cannon and the Mk 
88 machine gun mount. The M242 auto-cannon is an externally 
powered, dual-feed, single-barrel weapon that may be fired 
in semi-automatic or automatic modes.  The M242 does not 
depend on gases for operation but instead utilizes an 
electric motor to drive all the moving parts inside the 
cannon. Ammunition feeding, loading, firing, extraction and 
ejection are all done by the same motor. This motor 
requires ship’s power to operate and thus the weapon is, to 
a limited degree, dependent on that power.  [Ref. 36] 
   The relative cost-per-kill of the weapon is not an issue 
and so it meets this criteria quite easily.  The accuracy 
and thus the effectiveness of the weapon is where the true 
issues lie. These weapons are only rarely fired, primarily 
due to the fact they are only installed (if at all) just 
prior to a deployment to the Persian Gulf or Eastern 
Mediterranean Sea. The accuracy of these weapons is tested 
by shooting at a large inflatable ball that is set adrift 
by the ship for the purpose of target practice, 
qualification and familiarization fire. Historically, the 
ships have had to maneuver very close to effectively engage 
the large, stationary target.  It is logical to assume that 
the weapon would be less than effective against a target 
that is maneuvering to avoid being hit.    
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   The issue that comes to light with respect to 
feasibility of use is the fact that there are just too few 
of these in the arsenal.  Since these are not readily 
available, they are removed from ships immediately upon 
their return from deployment.  For example, the USS 
PRINCETON (CG 59) was only equipped with one of these 
weapons prior to its 1998 Persian Gulf deployment.  This 
single machine gun was installed in such a manner that it 
only provided limited coverage for one side of the ship.   
   Another significant shortcoming of this weapon is the 
lack of flexibility in its coverage.  Being permanently 
mounted on the deck and weighing too much to move without 
using a crane, the weapon is limited in its coverage to 
that of its cutouts. 
 







D. MACHINE GUNS AND SMALL ARMS 
   The next category and layer of defensive weapons, is the 
category referred to as “guns.” Like the MK 38 Chaingun 
above, these weapons are not guided.  Once the rounds leave 
the weapon they are fired from they travel on the path 
dictated by the barrel position at the time of firing.  
There is no correction to the flight path once fired and 
thus they are considered to be “dumb weapons.”  These 
weapons currently include: 
• 50 caliber Browning Machine Gun 
• 7.62 MM M-60 Machine Gun 
• 9 MM Beretta Handgun 
• 45 caliber Handgun 
• 7.62 MM M-14 Rifle 
• 223 caliber M-16 Rifle  
 
   With the exception of the “Machine Guns,” these weapons 
are all primarily used by Ship’s Self-Defense Force (SSDF) 
for protection against intruders on ships.  The machine 
guns are used for protection against swimmers, small boats, 
jet skis and even land-borne threats when necessary (pier 
attacks).      
 
   1. 50 Caliber Machine Gun 
   The 50 caliber Browning machine gun has a weight of 126 
pounds and is recoil operated, air-cooled, belt fed and 
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fully automatic. The gun has a firing rate of 450-550 
rounds-per-minute and a maximum range of 7,400 yards 
(effective 2,000 yards). [Ref. 36]   
 
 
Figure 13: Browning 50 Caliber Machine Gun  [From Ref. 38] 
 
   2. M-60 7.62 MM Machine Gun 
   The 7.62 MM  M-60 machine gun has a weight of 23 pounds 
and is classified as a lightweight, gas operated, air-
cooled, belt fed and fully automatic machine gun. The gun 
has a firing rate of 100-200 rounds-per-minute and a 
maximum range of 4,075 yards (effective 1,200 yards). [Ref. 
36]   
 
Figure 14: M-60 7.62 MM Machine Gun  [From Ref. 38] 
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   Both the above-mentioned machine guns are the current 
weapons of choice against the small boat threat.  The 
problem with these systems is not their cost cost-per-kill; 
they are both very low cost in terms of cost to use.  As 
far as feasibility of use, they are very likely to be 
employed if such a threat presented itself. The last 
criteria, is that of “effectiveness;” they are temporarily 
mounted on the decks of ships and are difficult to move in 
a hurry (this is more of an issue with the Browning machine 
gun that weighs 126 pounds).  While this issue does not 
make them impossible to use, it does limit their 
flexibility to be maneuvered readily so that they can be 
used to engage targets outside of their cutouts.   
   The most significant concerns center around their lack 
of accuracy and lethality.  The accuracy of these two 
weapons is subject to the aim of the sailor who is pulling 
the trigger.  There is no guidance system to assist the 
weapon in acquiring, locking onto or engaging the target or 
threat.  These weapons are unstabilized and use tracer 
rounds to assist the shooter in “walking-in” the rounds to 
the target.  For several reasons, sailors are usually 
ineffective in their employment of these weapons. Lack of 
adequate practice against a threat of this type, no  
targeting system to speak of and lack of visibility 
(especially at night) all lead to this ineffectiveness.       
   Above that, the question of lethality is also an issue.  
If the rounds were to hit the target in question, their 
effectiveness is questionable at best.  In essence, the 
rounds are heavy pieces of lead that are designed to 
penetrate light armor and have no explosive charge 
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associated with them.  The hope is that you might hit 
either the personnel on the target vessel or something on 
it that might disable the attacker or attackers.  At best, 
you are shooting an inaccurate weapon from an unstable 
platform hoping to hit a moving target in the hopes that it 
will be disabled or destroyed. 
  
   3. Small Arms 
   The last category of weapons currently in the armories 
of US Navy ships is small arms.  This category of weapons 
includes 9 MM and 45 caliber pistols, 7.63 MM and 223 
caliber rifles and finally the shotguns.  These weapons are 
very inexpensive to use and there would be little 
hesitation in their employment against an attack.  In fact, 
almost all ships in the US Navy arm their watch-standers  








        Figure 16: M-16 223 Caliber Rifle  [From Ref. 38] 
 
   The weapons that fall into this small arms class are 
primarily used to deal with intruders once they are onboard 
the ship.  These are not weapons that could be used 
effectively to combat the small boat/suicide attack.  While 
highly maneuverable and very inexpensive use, they would 
ultimately be ineffective against a threat of the type 
discussed in this thesis.   
 
    
Fi
  






gure 17: 45 Caliber and 9 MM Pistols  [From Ref. 38] 
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e issue or concern with these weapons is undoubtedly 
 accuracy and lethality.  These are the most flexible 
of the weapons in the arsenal due to their lightweight and 
ease of maneuverability. As such, they can easily be 
repositioned anywhere on the ship to combat a mobile 
threat.  The drawback is that they are even less effective 
against a target than the previously mentioned machine 
guns.  In the case of the machine guns, there was at least 





Figure 18: 12 Gauge Shotgun  [From Ref. 38] 
 
   None of the weapons currently used in the fleet today 
are capable (for a number of reasons) of filling the gaps 
left due to relative cost-per-kill, minimum range, 
lethality and feasibility of use.  There is a significant 
need for a weapon that is capable of engaging the threat 
effectively (destroying or disabling with one shot/one hit) 
while doing it within visual range (less than 1 nautical 
mile). A weapon is needed that is flexible in its usability 
and is not dependent on ship’s services (air, water, power, 
radars) for its use.  A weapon is needed that can be 
seamlessly integrated into the fleet and done so in a 
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timely manner without the traditional statement of 
requirements, research and development, testing and 
evaluation and the timely LRIP process.  The need exists 
for a weapon that can be delivered to the fleet in a matter 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE US ARMY JAVELIN MISSILE 
A. PRESENTATION OF THE WEAPON 
   The Javelin Anti-armor missile is a 49.5-pound, man-
portable, fire-and-forget, surface attack, anti-tank 
missile originally designed to counter the current and 
future threat armored combat vehicles. The original 
intention was to replace the Army and Marine Dragon missile 
system.  The 2,500-meter range of the Javelin more than 
doubled the range of the Dragon.  The Javelin has an 
advanced imaging infrared (I2R) system and a guided 
missile.  The system’s “soft launch” capability allows it 
to be fired from an enclosed firing position if need be. 
Once the missile is clear, the larger propellant in the 
second stage is ignited and the missile is propelled 
towards the target. The Javelin warhead can defeat all 
known armor systems. [Ref. 38]  
 
 
Figure 19: Javelin Command Launch Unit [From Ref. 38] 
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   The Javelin weapon system includes a missile in a 
disposable launch tube and a reusable Command Launch Unit 
(CLU), a basic skills trainer (BST), a field tactical 
trainer (FTT) and a Missile Simulation Round (MSR). The CLU 
has a trigger mechanism as well as an integrated day/night 
sighting device for surveillance and target acquisition.  
The CLU is powered by a disposable battery with a 4-hour 
life and provides the capability for battlefield 
surveillance, target acquisition, missile launch, and 
damage assessment.  
 
Figure 20: US Army Javelin   [From Ref. 38] 
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   The CLU houses the night vision sight (NVS).  The NVS is 
a passive I2R system. The NVS enables observation of things 
that are not normally visible to the human eye. It receives 
and measures IR light emitted by the environment. The NVS 
converts the IR light into an image for the gunner. The IR 
image also allows the gunner to identify enemy targets. 
Javelin gunners must identify battlefield combatants at 
night based on the images seen in the NVS. [Ref. 38]   
   The NVS is able to distinguish a temperature 
differential (∆T) of as little as one-degree (F) up to a 
distance of 2,500 meters.  This ∆T is represented by 
differing shades of green in the NVS.  The sensitivity of 
the NVS allows the shooter to target anything with a ∆T of 
more than one degree compared to its background.  Examples 
include: combustion engine exhaust, engine compartments, 
personnel and even hot gun barrels.  [Ref. 39] 
 
 
Figure 21: Measurable Delta-T (∆T)   [From Ref. 39] 
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   The round is comprised of the Launch Tube Assembly (LTA) 
and the Battery Coolant Unit (BCU). The round weighs 11.1 
kg, is 1.76 meters in length and has a 2.72 kg warhead with 
an impact fuse.  The missile is divided into three 
functional sections: the seeker section, warhead section 
and the propulsion section. The missile locks on to the 
target prior to launch by using an infrared focal plane 
array and an on-board processor that maintains target 
tracking from acquisition, through the launch phase and 
continuing until detonation.  
 
Figure 22: US Army Javelin Missile  [From Ref. 38] 
  
   The BST is a device used to train personnel in the 
proper use of the Javelin missile.  The BST is comprised of 
two units; the Student Station (SS) and the Instructor 
Station (IS).  The student station is basically a simulated 
CLU and a missile simulation round (MSR).  The instructor 
station is a desktop computer, a monitor, a keyboard, a 
mouse and a surge protector for the power supply.  The BST 
uses actual terrain models and real visible and infrared 
imagery.  What the trainee sees at the student station is 
what he or she would see in a real engagement.    
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Figure 23: Basic Skills Trainer [From Ref. 39] 
 
   The Javelin missile has a “back-blast danger area” that 
covers 30 degrees on either side of a line directly behind 
the LTA when fired.  This 60 degree cone-shaped danger area 
sector continues out to a 25 meter distance. There is a 
second “caution zone” that extends the cone-shaped area out 
to 100 meters. In addition to the back-blast danger area; 
debris and loose objects should be removed from the 
immediate vicinity, the area should be well ventilated to 
allow exhaust gases to escape and to prevent over-
pressurization of the firing area, the amount of flammable 
material in the area should be minimized and all personnel 





Figure 24: Javelin Back-blast Safety Zone [From Ref. 39] 
 
   The Javelin missile has two modes of attack.  These 
modes are classified as “top attack” (minimum effective 
range of 150 meters) and “direct attack” (minimum effective 
range of 65 meters). The top attack mode is the default 
mode for Javelin, but the gunner can select direct attack 
mode prior to firing. In the top attack mode the missile 
approaches from above the target and detonates on top of 
the target.  At maximum range, the missile flight path 
takes it to an altitude of 160 meters; this altitude varies 
according to the range of the target and is determined by 





Figure 25: Javelin Top Attack Mode [From Ref. 39] 
 
   In the direct attack mode the missile flies a more 
direct path to the target then impacts and detonates on the 
side, rear or front of the target.  The onboard software 
determines the exact flight path. At maximum range the 




Figure 26: Javelin Direct Attack Mode [From Ref. 39] 
   The Javelin missile is designed to be man-portable, 
self-powered and lightweight (49.5 pounds). These factors 
allow it to be very flexible in its employment. There are 
three methods of carrying the Javelin: tactical, short and 
long distance. On a ship, the Javelin could be easily 
carried from one firing position to another using the 
tactical carrying mode. This mode, used when re-positioning 
and contact with the enemy is expected, the CLU and LTA are 
assembled and they are carried on the gunner’s right 
shoulder with their hands on the controller and the LTA. 
  
Figure 27: Javelin Tactical Carry Mode [From Ref. 39] 
 
B. POTENITAL EMPLOYMENT IN MARINE ENVIRONMENT  
   The Javelin missile has been in production since 1994 
and has proven itself to the US Army and Marine Corps.  
Together, they will have procured a total of 17,497 
missiles as well as a significant number of CLU’s from 
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FY2000 to FY2007. The Javelin is currently in use by Army 
Airborne and Ranger troops, Special Forces, Light infantry, 
Mechanized infantry and the Marine Corps.  Since Milestone 
III, Full Rate Production decision, the Javelin has enjoyed 
ninety-three percent flight reliability and ninety-two 
percent “First-time gunner hits” (given a reliable round). 
The system has a very low life cycle cost in that its 
modular concept requires absolutely no maintenance and the 
weapon has a ten-year shelf life. [Ref. 40]  
 
   1. Mechanical Considerations 
   Every aspect of this weapon makes it a perfect fit for 
use in the maritime environment.  Mechanically, the weapon 
is sealed and therefore corrosion would not be a 
significant issue.  It is stand-alone and therefore would 
require absolutely no services from the ship to be 
employed.  The weapon is EMI-hardened and has been rugged-
ized for military use.  The ten-year shelf life combined 
with Javelin’s near zero maintenance requirements makes its 
preventative maintenance requirement negligible.  The 
system has a fully functional built-in test capability 
(BIT) as well.  
 
 
   2. Tactical Considerations 
   The weapon requires no radar system for its employment 
and therefore is can be used in any environment where radar 
transmissions would be a concern (transiting through a 
channel or next to a pier).  Its “feasibility of use” is 
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not an issue as the maximum range (2,500 meters) is such 
that it would allow engagement only when a target can be 
visually identified therefore all but eliminating 
accidental fratricide.  The weapon will not launch if a 
target is not locked onto and therefore the risks of 
accidental discharge is eliminated.  At less than fifty 
pounds the system is truly man-portable and its positioning 
on a ship is extremely flexible.  This flexibility allows 
for 360-degree coverage without the issue of cutouts that 
are experienced by other point-defense systems.   
   The Javelin is low profile (relative to other presently 
available systems) and can be integrated into the already 
existent topside security watches on all US Navy ships with 
little or no impact.  The footprint of the Javelin is non-
existent, there is no need to sacrifice another weapon 
system to gain this added capability.  It is both very 
accurate and very lethal.  Its physical size would allow it 
to be kept in the ship’s armory when not needed or required 
for self-defense.  The weapon could also be utilized by the 
already existent Small Craft Action Team (SCAT), the 
current-day method of protecting a ship from the “swarm 
tactics” used by multiple small boats.   
   Four CLU’s positioned throughout the main deck of a 
small ship or carried by a qualified topside security watch 
while in port or transiting a channel would provide more 
than adequate self-defense for a ship.  Vessels that are 
traditionally unable to have any other substantial self-
defense weapons such as surfaced submarines could 
effectively defend themselves.  Vessels such as torpedo 
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retrieval boats and small boats from larger vessels could 
become effective patrol craft should the need arise. 
   The NVS targeting system is effective enough that the 
Javelin could be used at night when small arms are normally 
rendered useless. The NVS system can be used as an 
effective surveillance tool when separated from the LTA.  
This would provide a significant nighttime capability that 
is currently non-existent to ship’s self-defense force 
personnel using traditional image intensification-type 
devices. The current devices, known as night vision 
goggles, require a minimum amount of light to work 
effectively and the images lack the clarity afforded by the 
NVS.  The images seen in the NVS by the gunner or watch 
stander would be incapable of being seen by the naked eye 
(see figures 28-30). 
 




Figure 29: IR Image “Boghammer” Boat [From Ref. 41] 
 
 
Figure 30: IR Image Helicopter [From Ref. 41] 
 
   There is significant evidence to suggest that Javelin 
would be a suitable and very effective weapon system if 
used in the marine environment.  A constant temperature 
background, in this case a body of water, would provide a 
best-case scenario for targeting based on temperature 
differential.   
   The cost-effectiveness of the Javelin missile will be 
addressed in detail in the following chapter.    
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   3. Comparative Ph and Pk Considerations 
   The Javelin missile is a proven weapon system in the 
land environment.  Prior to determining the feasibility of 
its use in the maritime environment certain comparisons to 
current weapon systems cannot be avoided.  Beyond the cost 
avoidance advantages that will be outlined in a later 
chapter, its relative lethality must be quantified and 
measured against existing systems.  Traditional methods of 
quantifying lethality entail assessing a weapon’s 
probability of hit and probability of kill (Ph and Pk).  The 
Ph is based on: 
 
        (1) The capability of the weapon system. 
        (2) The accuracy of the round. 
        (3) The range. 
        (4) Gunner proficiency. 
        (5) Target speed, maneuverability and  
  exposure. 
     
   The Pk is defined as the probability of killing the 
target if it is hit.  In the case of the threat outlined in 
this chapter, Pk will be based on the explosive power of the 
round at a given range and or the penetration effect 
provided by the release of the round’s kinetic energy. 
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   Again, the capability of the Javelin has already been 
proven several times over.  Several considerations combine 
to make engagements against enemy speedboats and suicide 
boats unrealistic beyond 2,500 meters. Not the least of 
which are rules of engagement (ROE).  ROE may be the single 
most difficult obstacle to overcome when using any weapon 
system. This portion of the thesis assumes that in the 
engagements discussed, the threat is real and the boats 
have been designated as hostile targets and thus the 
decision to destroy them will have already been made.     
   Range is a serious consideration that must be taken into 
account as well. It is possible to hit a small maneuvering 
enemy surface contact at 10,000 meters, but it is difficult 
to do so in a crowded harbor with numerous contacts in the 
vicinity.  Range is also important when the fact that in an 
environment such as that discussed in this thesis, positive 
visual identification (VID) must be attained prior to 
engagement.  Certain weapons currently in use have minimum 
ranges that would negate their ability to be used.  
Further, even given a hit, the likelihood that the target 
would be destroyed can range from very likely to not likely 
at all depending on the weapon used. 
   Given the limited amount of time between when the 
contact has been determined to be a threat and when the 
boat could attack or impact his or her vessel, the 
commander must manage his or her resources carefully. The 
idea is to make every round count, which requires 
engagement ranges favorable to the weapon in question. 
There is a balance. Engaging at too close a range frontally 
will increase the Ph and Pk, but will reduce the number of 
targets that can be destroyed before the attacker is upon 
the vessel’s position.  
   The number of targets and non-targets affects defensive 
operations. Speed of the attackers presents problems as 
well. Speed causes more targets to be at a given point 
(vessel position) during a specific period. The speed of 
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the target also affects the ability of the weapon to 
successfully engage and destroy the attacker. 
   When comparing the lethality of Javelin to current 
weapon systems in the fleet certain assumptions must be 
made.  The first assumption is that Javelin’s Ph and Pk will 
remain identical in the maritime environment as it is in 
the land environment. The remaining assumptions will be 
outlined below table 1. ISSUES / CONCERNSWEAPON SYSTEM Ph Pk LETHALITY MAX RNG MIN RNG CUTOUT
Penguin  (SH-60) 0.65 0.85 0.55 Y Y N HELO EMBARKED N CLASSIFIED
Harpoon 0.35 0.85 0.30 Y Y N PWR/TARGETING N $474,609
SM-1/2 0.20 0.75 0.15 Y Y Y/N POWER/RADAR N $400,000
RAM 0.20 0.65 0.13 Y CLASSIFIED Y POWER N $393,103
NSSM 0.65 0.65 0.42 Y N Y POWER N $165,400
CIWS (1B) 0.85 0.90 0.77 N N Y POWER/AIR LIMITED NEGLIGIBLE
3-inch / 5-inch Gun 0.30 0.85 0.26 N N Y POWER/RADAR N NEGLIGIBLE
Machine Guns 0.20 0.20 0.04 N N Y/N NONE Y NEGLIGIBLE
Small Arms 0.05 0.05 0.00 N N N NONE Y NEGLIGIBLE








Table 1.   Relative Comparison of Weapon Systems 
 
   The following is a list of assumptions that were made in 
table 1.  Cost-Per-Kill is computed assuming that one shot 
or burst of shots equates to one kill.  This assumption 
reflects best-case scenarios for each weapon system.  It 
assumes engaging a target at the optimum range that would 
result in maximum weapon effectiveness.  SM-1 launchers on 
frigates and the first five Ticonderoga-class cruisers (MK 
13 and MK 26 launchers) are subject to launcher cutouts.  
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CIWS (1B) placement on ships severely limits its use when 
pier-side.  Ph and Pk values for all weapon systems except 
Javelin are estimates based on input from a number of 
sources.  Javelin Ph and Pk values utilize actual values. 
Lethality values are limited to two decimal places. 
   As the table 1 reflects, Javelin has a lethality value 
of .83 compared to the next highest value of .77 in the 
case of CIWS. Javelin has the lowest relative cost per kill 
($65,000) of weapons without cutout limitations. 
Additionally, Javelin is the only weapon that meets all of 
the following criteria: A lethality of greater than .80, 
has no cutout limitations, has no range envelope 
limitations or concerns, requires no shipboard support 
systems and can be used pier-side.    
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V. COST ANALYSIS OF JAVELIN 
A. ACQUISITION PROCESS 
   The acquisition process used to acquire the Javelin 
missile was innovative in its design and ambitious in its 
cost-savings goals from the very start.  In 1986, the 
program management office developed an acquisition strategy 
designed to encourage competition during each phase of the 
program.  These phases included a Demonstration/Validation 
(DEM/VAL) phase, a fly-off phase, Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase and a competitive 
production phase.   
   The Javelin program began its DEM/VAL phase in August of 
1986 with a 27-month proof-of-principle (POP) and fly-off 
phase to evaluate three separate technology concepts: the 
laser beam rider system (Ford Aerospace/General Dynamics 
Corporation), imaging infrared seeker with fiber optic 
guidance (Hughes Aircraft Company/Honeywell) and the 
imaging infrared fire and forget seeker (Texas 
Instruments/Martin Murietta).  Each of these companies was 
awarded a $30 million firm-fixed price contract to develop 
a prototype and demonstrate its performance.  This method 
of demonstrated performance was critical to the overall 
cost reduction efforts.        
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   After completion of the POP a fly-off was conducted and 
the best system would be chosen for the EMD phase. The best 
system would be the one that best met the user’s needs and 
technology requirements, while still providing the best 
cost, lowest risk and best schedule.  The end result would 
be that there would be two qualified sources for full rate 
production. This competitive contractor teaming (CCT) or 
joint venture (JV) would continue on into the EMD phase. 
[Ref. 43 and 45] 
   In June of 1989 the EMD phase began with a cost-plus- 
incentive-fee contract awarded to Texas Instrument and 
Martin Marrieta (TI & MM). This contract allowed for the 
option of two low rate initial productions (LRIP). The goal 
of having MM and TI co-develop the system was to have them 
prove their production capabilities during the LRIP phases 
and then have them compete with each other for the full 
rate production phase (FRP) for a 60/40 split.  The result 
would be that the DoD would benefit from both the reduced 
risk (having two sources) and the economic benefits of 
competition between two contractors.   
   There were additional risk-reducing efforts in the 
contract verbiage as well.  As a result of the nature of 
joint venture contracting, the responsibilities and thus 
the risk would be divided equally between the two 
contractors.  The joint venture contractors would direct 
all sub-contracting and the government-furnished items 
would be limited.  The president of the joint venture was 
appointed from TI and a vice-president was appointed from 
MM.   
   Critical components were identified and were then 
required to be available from two independent sources.  
This dual sourcing would allow for reduced development risk 
and low unit pricing due to competition.  The critical 
components identified for this second sourcing would be the 
focal plane array (FPA), Electronics Safe Arm and Fire 
(ESAF), launch tube assembly (LTA), rate sensors (also 
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referred to as the gyro) and the on-board vessel (OBV). 
[Ref. 43]   
   While the efforts to save costs were substantial, there 
were significant issues that forced the cost of the program 
to increase and the benefits of joint venturing to 
decrease. The Javelin missile system experienced technical 
difficulties in items such as the propulsion unit, ESAF, 
missile and CLU FPA, batteries and even total system 
weight. Combined, these difficulties led to cost overruns 
and schedule delays.   
   From June 1989 (EMD awarded) until September 1991 the 
cost of the program increased 260 percent from the original 
estimate from the contractor.  There were other issues as 
well; the “right-sizing” and budget cutbacks also impacted 
the program as well.  The Army procurement quantity went 
from 58,000 down to 26,600 missiles and the CLU quantities 
decreased from 5,000 to 2,800. The Marine Corps also was 
impacted and their procurement decreased from 12,550 
missiles to 4,669 and their procurement of CLU’s went from 
1,486 to 464. Ultimately, the total cuts more than halved 
the original quantity estimates.  An additional restraint 
was placed on the program when the procurement program was 
extended from a 6-year production to a 10-year one; and 
then finally a 14-year procurement plan.  [Ref. 43] 
   As a result of the many issues outlined above, the 
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition and 
Technology) requested that the PM investigate present a 
Cost Reduction Plan for the program.  The implementation of 
the plan resulted in a cost savings of $1.4 billion and 
drastically impacted the joint venture strategy originally 
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pursued.  Of note was the decision to maintain the joint 
production into a third LRIP phase, FRP, two multiyear 
contracts, increase in government-furnished items and 
reducing the 14-year program to an 11-year contract.  [Ref. 
43]   
   In the early stages of Javelin development, the total 
invested in RDT & E was $768 million (then-year dollars).  
Prior to FY2003, the total procurement cost $2.399 billion 
dollars (TY$).  The following table will reflect yearly 
procurement of Javelin by fiscal year for the US Army. An 
additional 2,533 missiles and 418 CLU’s were procured by 
the US Marine Corps (the USMC procurement program ended in 
FY01). [Ref. 40] 
 














B. POTENTIAL SAVINGS IN COST AND TIME  
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   The fact that $2.399 billion has been spent in the 
research, development, testing, evaluation, fielding, 
logistics support and program office management is not a 
concern with respect to the purpose of this paper.  Rather, 
the purpose is to establish that the DoD can benefit from 
the “sunk cost” already invested in the project.  If the US 
Navy were to determine that the Javelin missile has a place 
on naval vessels for the purposes of anti-terrorism and 
force protection (AT/FP) then it could reap incredible 
benefits from the time and money invested by its Army and 
Marine Corps counterparts.   
   As stated earlier, the acquisition of a new weapon 
system is a process that is necessarily long and very 
expensive. These time and cost factors are necessary to 
verify that the potential system is necessary, feasible, 
functional, affordable and ultimately, field-able. These 
costs and delays are usually necessary if the weapon system 
is being developed from a set of new requirements generated 
for the purposes of fielding a new weapon system.   
   The principle point of this thesis is to establish that 
there is a need for a system such as Javelin in the 
maritime environment.  Javelin has proven itself as a 
functional and reliable weapon.  It has proven itself to be 
accurate and very functional even for first-time users.  As 
for cost efficiency, the “per unit cost” of $68,500 per 
missile and $104,000 per CLU, is relatively inexpensive. 
The question of whether or not the weapon can be fielded, 
has again, already been answered by the Army and Marine 
Corps.  The weapon is already in the supply system; as a 
result the logistics portion of the fielding requirement 
has already been met.   
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   There are Javelin training courses (010-ASI2C) already 
in existence at a number of installations.  These courses 
are designed to teach the unit medium range anti-armor 
weapons specialist the basics of the Javelin Weapon System, 
preparation for firing, how to restore to a carry 
configuration, carrying techniques, infrared principles, 
target engagement procedures, target engage-ability, 
warning indicators and malfunctions procedures, field 
tactical trainer operations and maintenance. The gunner is 
evaluated using the BST and the field tactical trainer. 
[Ref. 39]          
   To add to the Javelin’s case of field-ability, the 
weapon has already been field tested, rugged-ized, approved 
for military use, proven safe from the hazards of 
electromagnetic radiation to ordnance or “HERO-safe” 
(specifically in the land environment) and the logistics 
support system is already in place [Ref. 44]. The Javelin’s 
10-year shelf life and its near-zero maintenance 
requirements make it an almost off-the-shelf acquisition 
for employment on Navy vessels.   
   The majority of the cost savings would come from the 
negation of RDT&E dollars, $768 million in the case of the 
Javelin missile. Add to that the cost avoidance associated 
with entering/continuing the acquisition process late in 
the learning curve; and the total savings would be 
tremendous in terms of actual dollars.  Also, taking into 
consideration the 14 years of program maturity, the Navy 




C. FIELDING PROPOSAL 
   The current fleet size and composition is illustrated in 
table 3 below.  As both actual battle force vessels as well 
as the support vessels would be considered as targets by an 
attacker, both categories have been included in the 
proposal.      
 
 
SHIP CLASSIFICATION BATTLE FORCES
MISC DEFENSE 
FORCES 
Aircraft Carriers 12   
Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines 18   
Surface Combatants 105   
Nuclear Attack Submarines 54   
Amphibious Warfare Ships 40   
Combat Logistics Ships 31   
Support/Mine Warfare Ships 32 74 
Active Reserves 14 9 
Strategic Sealift   67 
SUBTOTALS 306 150 
TOTAL 456 
Table 3.   Ships of the US Navy [After Ref. 42] 
 
  73
   The fleet totals 456 vessels, 306 of which are what 
would be considered to be high profile or primary targets.  
However, the remaining 150 miscellaneous defense forces 
should be considered to be potential targets as well. While 
the 72 submarines might seem to be out of place on a list 
of vessels requiring a surface-to-surface point-defense 
system; the author submits that these are among the most 
vulnerable on the list.  The fact that submarines are 
limited to only the small arms on board for self-defense 
combined with the fact that they must enter and exit port 
surfaced make them a very attractive target for an attack 
from a small boat.  Table 4 below shows the weapons systems 
currently available on US Navy vessels for defense against 
small boats. As the table shows, not all weapons are 
available on all vessels.  More significantly, some vessels 
have only small arms available for defense against small 
boat attacks.   




















Aircraft Carriers X       X     X   X X 
Ballistic Missile 
Submarines                     X 
Surface Combatants X X X   FEW SOME FEW X FEW X X 
Nuclear Attack 
Submarines                     X 
Amphibious Warfare 
Ships       SOME SOME     SOME FEW X X 
Combat Logistics 
Ships                     X 
Support/Mine 
Warfare Ships                   X X 
Active Reserves         SOME         X X 
Strategic Sealift                   X X 
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   The fielding proposed for the Javelin missile into the 
fleet would be one that would take into consideration the 
size of each vessel, marine component available on each 
vessel and also the space available on each as well as 
adequacy of coverage.  The proposal for the quantity of 
“Sea Javelins” to be fielded would be as outlined in table 
5.  
 Table 5.   Proposed Fleet Fielding and Cost Projection 
VESSEL TYPE QTY (PER SHIP QTY)   TOTAL 
   CLU's Rounds BST/MSR   CLU's Rounds BST/MSR 
Aircraft Carriers 12 8 32 1   96 384 12 
Ballistic Missile 
Submarines 18 2 8 0   36 144 0 
Surface Combatants 105 4 16 1   420 1680 105 
Nuclear Attack 
Submarines 54 2 8 0   108 432 0 
Amphibious Warfare Ships 40 6 24 1   240 960 40 
Combat Logistics Ships 31 2 8 1   62 248 31 
Support/Mine Warfare 
Ships 106 2 8 0   212 848 0 
Active Reserves 23 4 16 1   92 368 23 
Strategic Sealift 67 4 16 1   268 1072 67 
TOTALS 456         1534 6136 278 
                
BST UNIT COST=  $63,803   COST PER ITEM: $104,000  $68,500  $66,139  
MSR UNIT COST= $ 2,336               
BST/MSR COST= $ 66,139 TOTAL COSTS/ITEM $159,536,000 $420,316,000 $18,386,642 
                
  TOTAL FIELDING COSTS $598,238,642  
 
   With an estimated total cost of $598,238,642 the Javelin 
missile represents an incredible cost avoidance opportunity 
to the DoD.  The total fielding cost would deliver a 
capable, tested and lethal weapon at a fraction of the cost 
the Marine Corps and Army paid to develop the same weapon. 
A fielding mix such as that illustrated in table 5 would 
allow a significant number of Javelin missiles to reach the 
fleet and provide adequate coverage for each vessel.  The 
BST’s (which include the cost for the MSR’s) would not be 
necessary for the submarines due to the space 
considerations on those types of vessels; the BST’s could 
be utilized at the squadron level for qualification and 
training purposes.         
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   An additional expense that would be incurred in the 
fielding of the Javelin missile on naval vessels would be 
the software needed to both validate its use in the 
maritime environment and to train personnel.  This cost 
would be incurred in the procurement of any newly developed 
system. The estimated cost of generating or modifying 
simulations to reflect sea/ocean backgrounds and targets 
would be $330,000.  The Javelin Program Office is in the 
initial stages of planning and budgeting for this now. 
[Ref. 40] 
   The Navy could potentially benefit from a reduced unit 
cost based on economic order quantity discounts if the 
fielding were to be spread over a number of years.  The 
production capabilities of the contractors might also be an 
issue leading to this course of action.  Currently the rate 
of production for CLU’s is 65 per month and 440 per month 
for the rounds. [Ref. 45] In either the case, the fielding 
and training of the Javelin missile could be modified so 
that it would equip the ships that are most vulnerable 
first. This list would include submarines, ships deploying 
overseas and vessels with the least self-defense 
capabilities.    
   The procurement quantities listed in table 2 are based 
on the quantities in the FY 03 President’s Budget with the 
Appropriation Conference Committee’s marks. In reality, the 
numbers in FY 03 reflect the quantities in the last year of 
Javelin’s second multi-year contract. The notional 
quantities in FY 04, FY 05 and FY 07 reflect what will be a 
single-year contract in FY 04 with option in the following 
years. FY 06 will depend primarily on foreign military 
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sales (FMS) to make up for the potential drop in production 
(zero).  
 
D. PROCUREMENT PROPOSAL 
   The Navy has three immediate options available to 
potentially procure the Javelin missile in the FYDP 
(estimate quantities to be 6,136 Rounds, 1,534 CLU's and 
278 BST/MSR combinations): 
 
1) The Navy could enter the procurement 
process immediately and purchase CLU's, 
BST/MSR's and rounds under the current 
(FY 2003) contract being executed and 
potentially take advantage of some type 
of economic order quantity discount.  
 
2) The Navy could enter the procurement 
process at the tail end of the current 
procurement plan in the President’s 
Budget and currently under contract 
negotiation (through FY 2007) and attempt 
to procure the Javelin during FY 2008. 
 
3) The Navy could procure its total 
quantities during the FY 2006 FMS-
dependent year where procurement 
estimates are currently zero. This 
scenario would allow for the negotiation 
of a multi-year contract where a twelve 
to thirteen percent savings could be 
realized (historic cost savings realized 
with multi-year contracts). 
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   The first proposal, which would allow for the quickest 
implementation into the fleet, is the least feasible. There 
are time constraints involved and FY 03 has already begun. 
There are some nineteen or twenty contractors involved in 
the production of the Javelin and the lead-time is between 
twenty-four and thirty-one months. Furthermore, the 
potential cost avoidance from an economic order quantity 
discount would not likely be realized at this late date. It 
would be difficult if not impossible to implement this 
proposal.  If the need for the weapon was realized and its 
procurement was decided upon in an expeditious manner, the 
quantities would need to be modified and the fielding of 
the Javelin to the fleet would need to be prioritized. It 
is unlikely that there would be any cost avoidance 
realized; in fact it is very likely that it would be more 
costly to procure any significant quantity with such short 
notice.    
   In the second proposal, the Navy would attempt to 
procure its Javelin procurement quantities during FY 08. 
This would have to be decided no later than 2004 to be 
entered into the FY 05 President’s Budget. The previously 
mentioned lead-time would require this type of advanced 
planning.  There would be no cost avoidance due to the fact 
that this would be yet another single-year contract.  While 
this option would allow for sufficient planning and would 
still procure weapons for deployment to the fleet, it would 
not realize any per-unit cost avoidance.  The DoD would 
still realize the benefits of avoiding the substantial sunk 
RDT&E costs and the even longer time delay in acquiring a 
weapon from inception through full rate production. 
   The final proposal would allow for both the best-case 
and second-best-case scenarios. If the procurement 
quantities could be approved and the fielding agreed to in 
time, then the DoD could benefit from converting three 
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(best-case) or two (next-best-case) single-year contracts 
into a single multi-year contract.  The best-case scenario 
would allow for FY 04 through FY 07 to be converted into a 
single multi-year contract with the Navy procuring its 
Javelins in FY 06 and both the US Army and Navy benefiting 
from the twelve to thirteen percent cost savings 
historically associated with multi-year contracts. 
   In the second-best-case scenario, FY 04 procurement 
quantities will have already been contracted and the 
contract for the remaining years (FY 05 through FY 07) 
could be combined into a single multi-year contract (three 
years vice four).  [Ref. 46]  Again realizing the economic 
benefits of multi-year contracts, albeit, to a lesser 
degree. The best-case scenario is illustrated below: 
 
(USA FY 04 to FY 07 FIELDING COST)   $520,813,570*  
     +       + 
(USN PROPOSED FLEET FIELDING COST)    $598,238,642# 
   DoD FIELDING COSTS TOTAL      $1,119,052,212 
  X        X 
MULTI-YEAR EXPECTED CONTRACT SAVINGS     13%  
  
= TOTAL COST AVOIDANCE     $145,476,788 
 
*USA FY04 to FY07 fielding cost based on 4,141 missiles X $125,770 each 
#USN Proposed fielding cost based on  Table 5  
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   The end result would be that the US Navy and the US Army 
would both realize cost avoidance benefits from the 
procurement of Javelin missiles for naval vessels. The 
maximum contract length would be five years due to current 
acquisition and procurement restrictions.  Also, there 
would have to be consideration given to the maximum 
production rates for both the CLU’s and the rounds.   
   Beyond the financial advantages outlined above, 
procuring the Javelin for the Navy would provide 
significant benefits in streamlining the time to acquire a 
much-needed weapon. The time normally spent conducting 
threat analysis, generating a mission needs statement 
(MNS), performing an analysis of alternatives (AOA), 
creating an operational requirements document (ORD), 
passing through the test and evaluation phases and passing 
through all the required milestones could be greatly 
accelerated. 




































VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS  
   The intent of this thesis was to examine the need for a 
stand-alone, point-defense weapon for use on surface 
vessels and surfaced submarines while entering and exiting 
ports, while in restricted waters and while pier-side where 
ship’s self-defense weapon systems are usually powered down 
or in an otherwise unusable state.  This thesis provided a 
real life analysis of the current self-defense weapons of 
US Naval vessels against the small boat and suicide boat 
threat. This thesis hopes to serve as a roadmap for a more 
in depth analysis of alternatives for this mission area.  
The author has systematically reviewed all existing weapon 
systems currently available to combat this threat.  The 
existing weapon systems were analyzed with respect to their 
relative cost per kill, lethality and feasibility of use. 
Additionally, this paper analyzed the potential suitability 
and effectiveness of the US Army Javelin Missile to counter 
this threat.   
   This paper further analyzed the cost that the US Army 
has invested in its acquisition of the Javelin missile.  
Ultimately, the goal of this thesis was to illustrate how 
both the US Navy and Army could benefit from a strategic 
financial partnership in the procurement of Javelin 
missiles for naval vessels. This benefit would be in the 
form of a thirteen percent cost avoidance for both. In 
short, the intent was to identify areas where US DoD can 
realize a tremendous cost avoidance while attaining a 
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substantially improved self-defense capability against this 
emerging asymmetric threat with minimal financial impact. 
   The weapon systems currently employed on most US Naval 
vessels were designed with a vastly different mission area 
in mind.  The blue water open ocean threats that these 
weapon systems were designed to counter, while not gone 
entirely, are not the most likely to be used against our 
ships and submarines today. The US has achieved relative 
dominance in the traditional maritime warfare areas.  As a 
result of this dominance there has been a rise in the 
development and use of asymmetric warfare tactics.  
   The DoD could benefit significantly with respect to both 
cost avoidance and schedule advantages in the fielding of a 
weapon system that is able to combat a new and prolific 
threat. These benefits should be taken advantage of at the 
earliest opportunity and the methods to do so will be 
outlined in the following section.   
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
   1. Contracting 
   The US Navy should work in an expeditious manner with 
the Javelin Program Contracting Office in order to take 
advantage of the current contract negotiations, which are 
scheduled to be finalized in February of 2003. The 
advantages are that the currently proposed single-year 
contract (with options) could be extended into a longer 
multi-year contract in order take advantage of the multi-
year contract benefits outlined in chapter V.   
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   Additionally, there would be no dependence on foreign 
military sales in FY 06. If the FMS’s do not occur, then 
any further procurement of the Javelin missile will be 
required to go through the “proving phase” as the 
production line will have been shut down for more than one 
year.  Both the US Army and Navy would benefit from the 
additional quantities of missiles and CLU’s. 
   Additional benefits include ease of integration of the 
weapon system in to the fleet.  The logistics and training 
portion of the entire program are already in place.  The 
sunk cost of RDT&E can be taken advantage of as well. 
 
   2. Software Development        
   Javelin Program Office should work with US Navy 
personnel in order to develop a robust training library for 
the training pipeline that would include engagement 
scenarios against the numerous types of attack craft 
available.  This library should include rubber rafts, jet 
skis, rigid-hulled inflatable boats, Boston whalers, 
fishing vessels and patrol craft.  This software would 
serve two purposes; firstly, it would allow for a detailed 
analysis of the performance of the weapon system in a 
marine environment. Issues such as vessel wake, sun 
reflection, optimum missile flight mode and maximum target 
speed could be identified and addressed through software 
simulation. Secondly, the software would serve as a 
training aid to be used when the Javelin has been delivered 





   3. Field Testing        
   Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren should begin 
generating testing criteria and scenarios to evaluate the 
Javelin against the target-types of interest.  This would 
provide real-life environment testing and determine if 
there are any limitations in the marine environment.  The 
results of this testing should be documented and integrated 
into the training curriculum that would eventually be 
developed.   
 
   4. Fielding 
   The final recommendation of this thesis would be the 
fielding of the Javelin missile itself.  That fielding 
could be in accordance with the fielding proposal in 
chapter V or another manner as determined by budget 
procurement quantities and or testing results.  Concurrent 
with testing and integrated with fielding, tactics should 
be developed on how best to utilize the Javelin and 
integrate it with ship’s self-defense force personnel. 
These tactics should be discussed, tested and documented in 
order to have standard phraseology and methods of use in 
the fleet.  Qualification standards should be developed and 
promulgated to the fleet as well as Navy Enlisted 
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